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STAI'EMENT OF rrlE 
rhe appeal contests the part of an order entered on February 
I s8J by the Honorable Jay E. Banks which modified a divorce 
,,crec so as to require tr1e Appellant to pay a debt not specifically 
rnPnt1oned in the decree. 
DISPOSITION MADE IN THE COURT 
Fol lowing a full hearing on Plaintiff-Respondent's Order 
to Show Cause why, inter alia, the decree should not be modified, 
the court modified the decree to order Defendant-Appellant to 
keep current the debt owed to United Bank in Murray, Utah and 
secured by Plaintiff-Respondent's automobile. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests affirmation of the district court's 
order modifying the decree or, in the alternative, a remand 
with instructions to enter judgment on the original decree for 
all arrearages and to enter an order directing Appellant to 
make all future payments on the debt in question. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set forth 
in Appellant's brief except as to the following particulars: 
l. The Respondent controverts the statement chat the "Decree 
no\ order Appellant to make the car payments ... ". Although 
''" ''r t'-iir1al decree did not specifically order the Appellant 
.nak,c the cat payments on the automobile in question, it did 
1 
order Appellant to pay "any a:-ia ail otn,2r ueots," e;nd 
them so far as possible from the proceeds ot his one-nalr 
in a trust deed note. (R.p.52, item no. 6;. 
2. The Respondent controverts the stat2.11ent that, "Thet, 
is no evidence in the record of changed circumstances betwe 2 ,, 
the parties occurring after tne entry of the Decree of Divorce." 
The trial court, following a full nearing, entered findings 
of fact to the effect that th2 debt in question was J?aid current 
by the Appellant at the time of, and for several months after, 
entry of the decree (R.p. 087, item no. 4;. Payment was made 
in the form of a lump sum payment by the Appellant prior to 
entry of the decree (R.p. 086-087, item no. 3). Therefore, 
the debt was not in default, and Respondent was not threatened 
with the loss of her vehicle, until several months thereafter. 
The court also found that Appellant's refusal to continue to 
make the payments resulted in the i<espondent having to cover 
the payment to avoid repossession of the automobile she needea 
to continue work and to care for her children (R.P. 37, ite1.1 
no. 6). 
ARGUl'1ENT 
POINT' l 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD JF 
THE TRIAL COURT BROAD DISCRETION IN TH£ EXERCISE Of rrs 
EQUITABLE POWERS AND CONTINUING JURISDICTION. 
'The trial court has broad discretion in tne it 
its equitable powers and continuing Jur 1s.J1ction an.J, ther2£•)r·,, 
the trial court's decision should not be Jisturbea so [,)n•3 
2 
redsonaoly supportable in the record. Utan Code Annotated, 
, .. s (1953J glves the trial court continuing Jurisdiction 
'",,,Jit/ t''" decree and case law allows the trial court to 
,,,,1se 0ouc:11 Jurisdiction within the limits of reason and prudence. 
111 v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1981), the court 
rdt 0 rates its position tnat, "lSJection 30-3-5 does authorize 
tne dl'JOrce court to reallocate property rights between the 
1iarties to the divorce,..". Id. at 186. In Flannery v. Flannery, 
536 P. 2d 136 (Utah, 1975), the court states tnat, "[T] he court 
has continuing jurisdiction to make changes in the. distribution 
ot property as shall be reasonable and prudent." 
The court articulates the standard of review to be applied 
to decree modifications in the recent case of Mccrary v. Mccrary, 
S99 P.2d 1248 (Utah, 1980). The court in Mccrary also indicates 
where the burden of proof lies and the deference which should 
be afforded tne factual determinations of tne trial court. 
"Under Utah law, a trial court granting a decree of 
divorce is afforded consiaerable discretion in the 
area of property distribution. Moreover, the court 
has continuing jurisdiction over tne parties with 
regard to the decree, enabling it to make such subsequent 
modifications as are equitable. The breadth of dis-
cretionary power given the trial court in the initial 
determination of the property division extends in 
equal measures to these subsequent modifications. 
in these matters, a party seeking a reversal 
or the trial court must prove a misunderstanding or 
rn i s ,:i ;-> p 1 i ca c i on of the law r es u l t i n g in s u b st an t i al 
d11d f'tPJudicial error, ur that tne evidence clearly 
fJtPkOride>rated against the findings, or that such a 
-er 1,h1s inequity resulted from the order as to constitute 
an at•u.oe of tne trial court's discretion. lt is not 
1·1e ,,;Je ot the AppelL::.t2 forum in such cases to evaluate 
l h •0 s a ci c i t y o E th e t r i a l co u r t ' s cJ e c i s i on , be i n g 
Ddserl as it is on shadings of fact and circumstance 
3 
unavailable to the reviewing court. If tne 02cision 
rests properly within tne bounds of Judicial oiscretion 
imposed by law, our inquiry is at an end ... 
• . • The trial court's ruling in the presenc action 
comports with that standard. Regardless of our own 
inclinations based strictly upon the record before 
us, Defendant has shown us no facts or circumstances 
enabling us to treat the decision below as being so 
inequitdble or devoid of evident1ary sup9ort as to 
constitute the abuse of discretion alleged. rhe burden 
of proof has not been met, and the decision is therefore 
affirmed. 
POicJ'l' 2 
THE APPELLANT dAS FAILED TO MEET dIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT fHE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WAS SO INEJUITABLE OR DEVOID OF 
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AS TO CONSTITUTE A REVERSIBLE ABUSE 
OF DlSCRE'rION 
The Appellant argues tnat the evidence does not show a 
change in circumstances and, therefore, the modification was 
an abuse of discretion. 'The Respondent controverts that conclusion 
in three particulars. First, the record supports tne conclusion 
that there was a substantial change of circumstances. The trial 
court's findings of fact relative to tne modification indicate 
that at the time the decree was entered Appellant was not onlt 
current on his payment of the aebt in question, but had pai·j 
several months in advance (R.p. 87, item no. 4). Based on this 
fact, neither the court nor tne Respondent nad reason to doubt 
that Appellant would continue to pay tne aebt, tnat Appe1lanc 
understood the debt to be his obligation, or to anticipat2 tnat 
the Respondent would have to pay the monthly payment to aJui · 
repossession of her 1neans of transportation (R.p. 87, item no.,,., 
Tnerefore, when Appellant unexpectedly cea.;ed to make 
4 
--
,,usc<1u2nt t,:i entry of tne decree, a substantial change occurred 
,1,,11 tec'YUlred the court to exercise its equitable powers on 
if uf the Respondent. 
;,,,,ond1y, it is questionaole whether in substance tne court's 
order relative to the debt in question constituted a modification 
:)f the original decree. Although tne order was so labeled, 
tne record is clear tnat the debt in question existed at the 
t1rne the decree was entered (R.p. 87 item no. 4) and that the 
decree, witnout specifically mentioning the debt, declared "any 
and all other debts" to be the responsibility of the Appellant 
(R.P. 521 item no. 6). In the case of Zaharias vs. Zaharias, 
6)2 P.2d 1312 (1982) the court ruled that no showing of a change 
of circumstances is required where the court merely construes 
the language of the decree. In substance, the order of the 
court now being reviewed constituted a construction of the language 
of the original decree, rather than a modification. Accordingly, 
under principles articulated in the Zaharias case, the order 
is supportable witnout a showing of change in circumstances. 
finally, the result reached by the trial court is equitable 
,n tne basis that the Appellant's advance payment,- evidenced 
'''il' 112 nad a:ireea to make such payments and, therefore, that 
tn'" court was not unexpectedly imposing this burden upon him. 
1 1, ''"11rt upun a full hearing unequivocally re]ected Appellant's 
nt tnat such advance [Jayment was simply a pay back of 
111oney he had borrowed for an extraneous purpose (R.p. 87, 
l t >:',[I fl I) , 4 ) 
5 
POINT 3 
IF THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PREVENTS THE Tilc.1 
THE APPELLANT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEBT JNDER rHE TEHMS 0F 
THE ORIGINAL DECREE 
Appellant argues that property distr ibucion issues were 
fully litigated prior to toe original divorce decree and, therefore, 
that the doctrine of res Judicata precludes relitigation. rne 
Respondent contends that if the property distribution were fuil; 
litigated prior to the decree, and if tne ;natter of the debt 
in question were considered, then the decree clearly fixed res-
ponsibility for ·payment of the debt on the Appellant under tne 
language that Appellant was to pay "any and all other d2bcs" 
(R.p. 52, item no. 6). rnerefore, the order of tne court did 
not modify the decree, it merely clarified it by giving a reasonable 
interpretation to its language. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court is allowed broad discretion in exercising 
its equitable powers and its continuing jurisdication to modify 
divorce decrees. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not 
disturb the judgment of the trial court unless it is obvi0usly 
inequitable or devoid of evidentiary support. The Ap:;iellant 
has failed to satisfy this standard because the recor:l sno,;s 
that the dee is ion of the tr ia 1 court was equitable al1d tn"' 
there was a substantial change of circumstances, or in the alter-
native, that there was no need to show a :::nange in circu1nstances 
because the original aecree clearly rixeo tne responsib1J 1 ' 
6 
I U[ µa;rncnt of ex1st1ng Jebls on the Appellant. 
Rc>o,pectfully submittea day of August, 1984. 
BAILEY & N2LSON, P.C. 
J //avid Nelson 
for Respondent 
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